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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION TO AMEND 
WITHOUT SUPPORTING ITS DECISION WITH ANALYSIS 
As a general rule, a trial court considering a motion to amend has an affirmative 
obligation to explain its reasoning before either granting or denying the motion. In Kelly v. 
Hard Money Funding. Inc.. 2004 UT App 44, 87 P.3d 734, this Court "reiterate[d] the well-
accepted rule that it is a per se abuse of discretion for a trial court to fail to explain its 
decision regarding a motion to amend with reference to the appropriate principles of law or 
the factual circumstances that necessitate a particular result." Id. at f^42 (emphasis added) 
(citing Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty West Development. 970P.2d 1273,1281-82 (Utah 
1998); Trethewav v. Furstenau. 2001 UT App 400, ^16, 40 P.3d 649). 
Appellee Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints (CPB) implicitly acknowledges that the denial of the motion to amend at issue 
here did not contain any supporting analysis, but nevertheless argues that the denial was 
appropriate because the reasons for denying the motion to amend were "apparent." CPB 
Brief at 11. It is true that the Utah Supreme Court did hold in Aurora. Credit Services that 
a motion to amend can be denied without analysis if the grounds for denial are apparent. Id. 
at 1282. In relying on this decision, however, CPB neglects to point out that the Aurora 
Credit Services court went on to hold that the grounds for denial were not apparent in that 
case, and therefore ordered the trial court to reconsider the motion on its merits. Id. 
Regardless, the Aurora Credit Services court cited the decision of the Tenth Circuit 
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in Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho. 31 F.3d 1023 (10th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that 
a denial of a motion to amend that is not properly supported by analysis can be proper if the 
grounds for denial were apparent, and Pallottino is particularly instructive here. In Pallottino, 
the court explained this rule by noting that the grounds for denial in that case were "clear 
from the record." IcL at 1027. Specifically, the plaintiffs claims in that case had already 
been dismissed as a matter of law on immunity grounds, and the proposed amendment did 
not offer any new evidence that would have altered the analysis. Id 
The situation in Pallotino is a far-cry from the scenario now before this Court. There 
has been no dismissal as a matter of law in this case, and the proposed amendment therefore 
isn't subject to any prior ruling that would make its resolution a mere formality. Further, 
unlike the claim at issue in Pallottino, there is no single "apparent" reason for this denial that 
is "clear from the record." Instead, even CPB's brief is forced to take a shotgun approach 
to explaining the ruling. In explaining why it thinks that the trial court denied the motion to 
amend, for example, CPB alternatively argues that it might have been because: (1) the motion 
to amend wasn't properly supported with particularized analysis (CPB Brief at 12); (2) 
Whited never addressed the prejudice prong of the motion to amend analysis (CPB Brief at 
13); (3) Whited never addressed the timeliness of the motion to amend (CPB Brief at 13); (4) 
the motion to amend was untimely (CPB Brief at 12-13); or (5) the motion to amend was 
futile (CPB Brief at 14-17). 
Though any of these five arguments may or may not have merit, the fact is that the 
trial court did not mention any of them in its analysis, nor did it mention any other particular 
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reason either. As such, CPB's inability to identify or focus on a single reason that "clearly" 
explains what the trial court actually did betrays its own position. Again, the question what 
the trial court could have been thinking; the question is what the trial court actually was 
thinking. CPB's failure to identify anything more particular than a list of five possible 
reasons therefore strikes at the heart of its own clarity-based argument. 
This Court should decline the invitation to get involved in a guessing game regarding 
the trial court's actual intentions, and should instead follow its "well-accepted" precedent and 
hold that it was a per se abuse of discretion to deny the motion to amend in this case without 
offering supportive analysis. 
II. WHITED DID NOT HAVE ANY OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS THE PREJUDICE 
OR TIMELINESS ISSUES IN HIS MOTION TO AMEND. 
CPB also argues that Whited's motion to amend was improper because he "never 
discussed the timing of the motion" or the "prejudice to CPB" in his motion to amend. 
CPB's Brief at 13. The problem with this argument is that it runs afoul of direct precedent 
from this Court. In Kelly, this Court definitively held that there is no set factor or set list of 
factors that must be pleaded and ruled on in a Rule 15 analysis. Kelly, 2004 UT App 44 at 
TJ38-42. Instead, this Court emphasized that a motion to amend can be granted or denied 
based on even a single factor. Thus, CPB's suggestion that Whited was required to have 
discussed any particular aspect of the case in filing the motion to amend is simply incorrect 
as a matter of law. 
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III. THE MOTION TO AMEND IN THIS CASE WAS NOT UNTIMELY. 
CPB suggests that the motion to amend that was filed in this case was filed "after an 
extensive delay" and should be denied on that basis alone. CPB's Brief at 12. In Kelly, this 
Court stated that a motion to amend is typically deemed untimely when it is either filed (1) 
"in the advanced procedural stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of 
discovery, on the eve of a scheduled trial date, or after an order of dismissal has already been 
entered," or (2) when it is filed "several years into the litigation." Id. at ffi[29-30. 
As indicated in CPB's brief, the motion to amend at issue was filed on March 2,2006, 
and sought to add a number of parties that were first identified by CPB on June 16, 2005. 
CPB's Brief at 5-6. There has been no allegation that Whited was aware of these additional 
parties' identities at any time prior. To the extent that there was a "delay" in filing the 
motion, this delay would therefore constitute a grand total of nine months, which is a far cry 
from the "several years" rule identified in Kelly. 
Further, CPB also acknowledges that litigation was still ongoing when the motion to 
amend was filed. Specifically, the trial court had entered a scheduling order on December 
4, 2005, and that there was only "an anticipated trial date of July 2007." CPB Brief at 6 
(emphasis added). Indeed, that same scheduling order set forth a deadline for amending the 
pleadings, a deadline that Whited met. It therefore simply cannot be said that this case was 
in the "advanced procedural stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of 
discovery, on the eve of a scheduled trial date, or after an order of dismissal has already been 
entered." Kelly, 2004 UT App 44 at f29. Given this, CPB's assertion that there was 
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anything untimely about this motion is simply incorrect. 
IV. THE REASONS FOR THIS MOTION TO AMEND ARE CLEAR. 
Motions are not filed in isolation or in a vacuum, but are instead filed as a result of 
the procedural and factual developments in a case. Here, Whited sought leave to amend his 
complaint for a very specific reason: to join "additional parties who have an interest in the 
well which is the basis for this lawsuit." R. at 576-77. The reason for this was clear to all 
involved: namely, CPB had earlier opposed Whited's Rule 34 inspection request on the very 
specific basis that these particular parties were not party to this lawsuit. Given this, extensive 
elaboration was not necessary in the Rule 15 motion, insofar as it was well understood that 
Whited was simply trying to remove the obstacle that CPB had already raised to the Rule 34 
motion CPB's assertion that Whited has somehow not explained the basis for his Rule 15 
request is disingenuous and incorrect. 
V. THIS MOTION TO AMEND WAS NOT FUTILE. 
Finally, CPB asserts that this motion to amend can be denied because it was futile. 
There are three problems with this argument. 
First, it is well accepted that the decision whether to deny or grant a motion to amend 
rests within the discretion of the trial court. As discussed above, the trial court here did not 
offer any basis for denying this motion to amend. Thus, Whited, CPB, and this Court are all 
left to guess at the trial court's thinking. Regardless, the claim that the motion was "futile" 
is necessarily based upon the assertion that Whited could not have prevailed on his claims 
had the motion to amend been granted. In other words, CPB's position is that because the 
Page 7 
quantum of evidence that it presented at the earlier hearing seemed to indicate that the water 
sources were unrelated, it could not be possible that placing monitors in the wells would 
produce different results. While the evidence may or may not suggest this, at least one expert 
involved in the case-Dr. Kip Solomon, who is a trained geologist-believes that there is a 
connection. Though CPB has attacked his theories, CPB has yet to have Dr. Solomon 
disqualified from testifying as an expert in this case. Thus, CPB has essentially asked this 
Court to rule as a matter of law that Dr. Kip Solomon's opinions aren't just wrong based on 
the evidence currently before it, but also that they could not even possibly be correct. This 
Court is a court of law, not of geology, and it should not accept the invitation to play the part 
of scientific arbiter in this case. 
Second, CPB's argument is circular. Specifically, CPB points to Whited's lack of 
evidence as the basis for its futility argument, while at the same time ignoring the fact that 
Whited' s stated reason for requesting a Rule 34 inspection was to procure that very evidence. 
This is akin to a business refusing to provide documents in a civil dispute, and yet then 
requesting a dismissal based on the fact that the other side hadn't been able to identify any 
internal documents that supported its position. More specifically, this would be akin to a 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case refusing to submit to an independent medical exam, 
and yet then arguing that the defendant's experts theories could be legally dismissed because 
they were unsupported by observations of her own actual physical condition. 
In order for the trial court (and by extension this Court) to have a proper foundation 
for any factual rulings on this case, Whited needs to be allowed to conduct the reasonable 
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discovery that he has requested. Without such discovery, the evidence will continue to be 
one-sided, and it will obviously continue to favor the one and only party with access to the 
evidence in question-all in clear contravention of the two-party nature of our adversarial 
system. Under such circumstances, it is simply not equitable nor fair for CPB to request a 
dismissal of Whited's case based upon nothing more than its own refusal to allow Whited 
access to conduct meaningful discovery. 
Third, CPBfs excoriation of Dr. Solomonfs "untested theory'1 makes Whited's point for 
him. There is no way for Dr. Solomon to test the theory without the discovery that was 
requested. This is amply clear from both the record below and the brief in chief. All of the 
other arguments CPB makes with respect to stem from the fact that no discovery has been 
allowed. Of course Dr. Solomon's theory is untested; CPB refuses to allow access to the data 
that would allow such testing, and the District Court refused to make CPB produce that data. 
The references to the findings made as a result of the evidentiary hearings 
mischaracterizes those findings. The district court did not make any findings regarding the 
presence or lack of hydrological connection. Rather, it found that Mr. Whited failed to 
produce up to that point any evidence of such a connection that would tend to support the 
issuance of a preliminary injunction. ". . . Whited has not placed before this Court any 
empirical evidence to establish a 'measurable connection' between the water supplying the 
CPB wells and that supplying his points of diversion . . . .* ' (Finding 16, R. 399, emphasis 
supplied). "Whited has failed to offer any empirical evidence under either theory of 
connection advanced to establish the existence of a measurable connection between the 
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underground water supplying CPB's water rights and the water supplying Whited's surface 
water rights." (Conclusion 6, R. 401, emphasis supplied). 
Note that the finding and conclusion do not state that there is no connection between 
the water rights; rather, they simply state that no evidence of the same has been presented. 
This is typical and appropriate for a finding and conclusion made in connection with a 
motion for preliminary injunction. Given that the discovery phase after such a motion but 
before trial normally yields evidence, the result at trial could be the opposite. But only if the 
discovery is permitted to occur. 
This underscores why the "findings" below are a red herring: they were held in 
connection with Mr. Whited's pursuit of a preliminary injunction, not as a result of a fully 
developed record from discovery. The only purpose that such findings and conclusions have 
is to determine whether a preliminary injunction should issue. They are always subject to 
modification based upon evidence adduced through the discovery process. Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. To rely on them for the proposition of "been there, done that" is 
therefore disingenuous. 
CPB 's argument that Whited is improperly arguing the denial of the discovery motion 
in connection with this appeal of the denial of his motion to amend is meritless. CPB opened 
the door to this argument below by specifically invoking the denial of the discovery motion 
as a reason for denying a motion to amend. This has been addressed in detail in the brief in 
chief. 
Page 10 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the decision of the district court to 
deny the motion to amend and the motion to compel. 
DATED this _k£_day of January, 2007. 
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